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Abstract
We develop a structural option price model in which individuals choose among competing
risk-mitigating programs to alter their probability of experiencing future years in various
degraded health states. The novel aspects of this model include separate estimates of the
marginal utilities of avoiding years of morbidity and lost life-years. With these marginal
utilities, we may evaluate a broad spectrum of probabilistic health outcomes over any period
of an individual’s future life. The model also reduces potential biases associated with single-
period, single-risk models typically used to produce estimates of the Value of a Statistical
Life (VSL) by allowing individuals to substitute risk mitigation across competing sources of
risk and across future years of their lives. We evaluate this model using data from a national
survey that contains a choice experiment on demand for the mitigation of illness-specific
risks.
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1 Introduction
Individuals face a portfolio of distinct health risks such as heart disease, accidents, cancers,
strokes, respiratory disease and many others. Individuals and policymakers may mitigate
these risks through expenditures on privately available preventative care and medical ther-
apies and publicly provided environmental, safety and health programs. The consumer’s
problem is to optimally allocate expenditures to each risk-mitigating program for each fu-
ture year of their life. An important dimension of this problem is that the severity of each
health risk will vary over an individual’s lifespan. Furthermore, the majority of these risk-
mitigating programs involve multiple periods of costs and yield uncertain future benefits.
In empirical analyses, researchers have tended to simplify this consumer problem to render
it more tractable. They estimate the wage-risk or the wealth-risk trade-oﬀ by assuming the
individual considers a single health risk that is reduced with certainty in the current period
(Dreze, 1962; Jones-Lee, 1974). Missing are multiple risks and inter-temporal decision-
making under uncertainty. These traditional single-risk, single-period models have motivated
hundreds of empirical demand analyses, including many of those currently used to evaluate
the social benefits of life-saving public policies (Viscusi, 1993). The central contribution of
the present paper is an empirical model that not only generalizes the traditional model but
also provides previously unavailable demand information.
Our choice model assumes that individuals face a portfolio of competing sources of risks,
each with a diﬀerent time profile of health states. The consumer’s problem is to choose the
set of risk mitigation programs that maximizes the present discounted value of the expected
utility that each individual derives from his or her remaining lifespan, subject to the usual
income constraint, a discount rate, and stated program prices. This is a multi-period model
of demand, based on the individual’s indirect utility function in each future year of life.
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The individual’s fundamental element of choice is the probability of alternative health-
states in future years. To accommodate the probabilistic nature of both health states and
program benefits, we recast the traditional model in an option price framework (Graham,
1981). Our parameter estimates for the marginal disutilities of avoided degraded health-state
years depend explicitly upon the latency of the program benefits, the stream of program costs,
and the individual’s discount rate and future income.
This model generalizes the traditional single-risk, single-period model in several ways.
First, it allows individuals to substitute risk-mitgating expenditures across diﬀerent sources
of risk. Omitting relevant substitutes (and the prices of these risk-mitigation programs)
from the individual’s choice set may bias the estimates of marginal utility (Rosen, 1988;
Dow et al., 1999).3 Second, it permits individuals to allocate risk-mitigating expenditures
across current and future years of their lives. Assuming the individual’s allocation of risk-
mitigation expenditures is a one-period problem, when in fact it is a multi-period problem,
may also yield biased estimates.4 Third, rather than addressing risk reduction with certainty,
we recast demand in a formal option price framework.
Most importantly, our model permits us to estimate both the marginal utility of avoiding
a future year of morbidity and the marginal utility of avoiding a lost life-year. Most actual
programs do not “save” lives; rather they extend life by deferring the future onset of mor-
bidity or the event of death. Both policymakers and scholars have long sought a tractable
and theoretically consistent empirical model that would describe how the marginal value
of avoiding a year of morbidity or a lost life-year varies across an individual’s remaining
3Recently, scholars have sought to allow for substitution between pairs of risks (Liu and Hammitt, 2003).
4One might argue that hedonic wage studies are exempt from this critique, since wage contracts may
be interpreted as one-period contracts. However, when choosing across occupations, individuals may, in
eﬀect, choose across time-paths of risk-wage premia that implicitly embody inter-temporal substitution of
risk mitigation (Aldy and Viscusi, 2003).
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lifespan.5 To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first such estimates in the literature.
Ideally, we would estimate our model of demand for risk mitigating programs using
market data. However, given the absence of market data, we have chosen to administer a
national survey that elicits individuals’ choices over alternative risk-mitigation programs.
Each health risk is presented as an illness profile that describes a probabilistic time pattern
of health states that the individual could experience. Each profile is cast in terms of a
specific major illness: heart disease, various cancers, stroke, respiratory diseases, diabetes,
Alzheimer’s, etc. For each illness, the profile describes the individual’s future age at the time
of onset, the severity and duration of treatments and morbidity, the age at recovery (if there
is any), and the number of lost life-years (if there are any).
We then present individuals with an illness-specific health-risk reduction program that
involves diagnostic screening, remedial medications, and life-style changes that would reduce
their probability of experiencing that illness profile. Individuals must pay an annual fee to
participate in each risk-reducing program. They are asked to choose between one of two risk
reducing programs (each associated with a diﬀerent illness profile) or to reject both programs.
An advantage of this choice setting is that the individual faces a portfolio of health risks that
resemble those they actually face. Through their choices, individuals reveal trade-oﬀs across
specific illnesses and a full continuum of health states of diﬀerent durations. We also observe
them strategically allocating expenditures for risk mitigating programs across the current
year and future years of their remaining life. To analyze individuals’ program choices, we
estimate a modified translog indirect utility function using 7,520 choices by respondents to
a representative national survey of approximately 2,439 U.S. citizens. Our estimated model
5Several popular per-year estimates have been developed to meet this need, but none of these describes
the marginal utility of avoiding a year of morbidity or premature death. For Quality-Adjusted Life Years
(QALYs) see Gold et al., (1996) and for the Value of a Statistical Life Year (VSLY) , see Moore and Viscusi
(1988).
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recovers estimates of the marginal utility of avoiding a year spent in each of three health
states: morbidity, post-morbidity and mortality.
To illustrate the implications of our model, we focus on willingness to pay to avoid five
archetypical illness profiles: 1) shorter-term morbidity with recovery, 2) longer-term morbid-
ity with recovery, 3) a combination of shorter-term morbidity and premature mortality, 4) a
combination of longer-term morbidity and premature mortality, and 5) immediate mortality.
This exercise illustrates the way in which our model generalizes the concept of the Value of
a Statistical Life (VSL). Rather than representing only the special case of mortality in the
current year, our model describes the value of avoiding a wide variety of statistical illness
profiles and characterizes how that Value of a Statistical Illness (VSI) will vary across an
individual’s remaining lifespan. By way of sensitivity analysis, we illustrate how diﬀerent
conditions—with respect to (1) discount rates, (2) income levels and (3) program latency for
individuals of diﬀerent ages—aﬀect the marginal value of risk mitigation and, in turn, the
value of avoiding diﬀerent types of statistical illnesses.
We present our basic structural model in Section 2, showing that the traditional concept
of a VSL is a special case of the more general Value of Statistical Illness. To illustrate our
model with an empirical application, we outline our survey methods in Section 3, and our
model’s parameter estimates in Section 4, along with some sensitivity analyses. Section 5
concludes.
2 A Structural Option Price Model
Our structural model interprets individuals’ choices as revealing their option prices for pro-
grams that mitigate the risks of uncertain future health states. The model allows a great deal
of flexibility in characterizing how future health states impact future income and program
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costs in each future year. Program choices have inter-temporal consequences. However, our
model remains one of static decision-making, with future costs and benefits converted into
equivalent present values.
2.1 Indirect Utility of Health State Years
We focus on four distinct health states: 1) a pre-illness healthy state, 2) an illness state, 3)
a post-illness state (if the illness is non-fatal) and 4) death. Let i index individuals and let t
index time periods.6 In its simplest form the individual’s indirect utility function might be:
Vit = βf(Yit) + α0preit + α1illit + α2rcvit + α3lylit + ηit (1)
This form allows the undiscounted marginal utility of some function of current income, f(Yit),
to be some parameter β, which we generalize right away to be a function of the individual’s
income, β0+β1Yit, to allow for diminishing marginal utility of income. In the current paper,
we will assume simply that f(Yit) = Yit. Let the undiscounted utility from the pre-illness
status quo health state (preit = 1) be α0, and let the (dis)utility from each future year of
illness (illit = 1) be defined as α1, from each year of the post-illness state (i.e. “recovered,”
rcvit = 1) be α2, and from each year of premature death (i.e. “life-year lost,” lylit = 1) be
α3. The indicators for each health state, illit, rcvit, and lylit, play a role that is equivalent
to adjusting the limits of the summations used in calculating the present value of future
continued good health, future intervals of illness, post-illness time, and life-years lost. In
this paper, the disutility of each of these states will be interpreted as being the same as the
utility associated with avoiding them.
6Time is measured in years, months, or even smaller units of time, depending on the degree of resolution
needed to conform with the illness profile in question.
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2.2 Present Discounted Values of Indirect Utility
We next develop a structural model of the ex ante option price that individuals are willing
to pay for a program that reduces their risk of a future illness profile. Define the present
discounted value of indirect utility V jki for the i
th individual when j = A if the program
is chosen and j = N if the program is not chosen. The superscript k will be S (denoting
“sick”) if the individual suﬀers the illness and H (denoting “healthy”) if the individual does
not suﬀer the illness. When discounting, we assume the individual uses the same discount
rate, r, to discount both future money costs and health states.7 Let the discount factor be
δt = (1 + r)−t .
The present value of indirect utility if the individual does choose the program and does
suﬀer the illness takes the following form. All summations below run from 0 to Ti, the
remaining number of years in the individual’s nominal life expectancy:
PDV (V ASi ) = β0
X
δtf(Y ∗it − cA∗it ) + β1
X
δt(Y ∗it − cA∗it )f(Y ∗it − cA∗it ) (2)
+α1
X
δtillAit + α2
X
δtrcvAit + α3
X
δtlylAit + ε
AS
i
where Y ∗it = Yi
¡
preAit + γ1ill
A
it + rcv
A
it + γ2lyl
A
it
¢
, and cA∗it = c
A
i
¡
preAit + γ3ill
A
it + rcv
A
it + γ4lyl
A
it
¢
.
Eﬀective incomes and costs, Y ∗it and c
A∗
it , are suﬃciently general to allow for a number
of diﬀerent assumptions about how individuals view the implications of illness for their
income stream and how they view their cost obligations under each program in diﬀerent
health states. Exactly what individuals assume about their future income and program
7Empirically estimated discount rates for future money as opposed to future health states are suspected
to diﬀer to some extent. Discount rates also diﬀer across individuals and across choice contexts, time
horizons and sizes and types of outcomes at stake. No comprehensive empirical work has been undertaken
that conclusively demonstrates the relationships between money and health discount rates. If we were to
choose hyperbolic discounting for our specification, all of the discount factors in the expressions for present
discounted value would need to be changed from 1/(1 + r)t to 1/(1 + t)λ.
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costs, if they choose the program or not, has implications for the formulas we develop in
later sections. We define γ1 as the fraction of the individual’s income that will be earned
while the individual is sick, should he suﬀer the illness in question. Our default assumption
will be that individuals expect constant real annual income Yi in each future year until the
expected time of death if the individual gets the illness. When γ1 = 1 and γ2 = 0, the term
preAit + γ1ill
A
it + rcv
A
it + γ2lyl
A
it =
¡
1− lylAit
¢
in equation (2) will be nonzero in those periods
when the individual is still alive. Let γ2 be the fraction of income received if the individual
is no longer living because they suﬀered from the illness. We assume this parameter is zero
in our empirical models, but a non-zero value could be invoked to activate a bequest motive.
For program costs, we assume that the annual costs of the risk-management program in
question are incurred in the years leading up to the onset of the illness or injury, but are
not paid while the individual is sick or injured.8 Therefore, the parameter γ3, the fraction of
the cost of the program that must be paid while the individual is suﬀering from the illness
in question, is zero. Likewise, the individual would not participate in the program if dead,
so we will assume that γ4 = 0 is inferred by respondents. If the individual recovers from the
illness or injury, rather than dying from it, they will again participate in the risk-management
program until their death. When γ3 = γ4 = 0, the term pre
A
it + γ3ill
A
it + rcv
A
it + γ4lyl
A
it =
preAit + rcv
A
it in equation (2) will be non-zero only prior to the onset of the illness or during
the post-illness state.
The present value of indirect utility, if the individual does choose the program but does
not suﬀer the illness, involves no illness, no post-illness state, and no reduced lifespan. Thus,
the expression for indirect utility takes the following form:
PDV (V AHi ) = β0f(Yi − cAi )
X
δt + β1(Yi − cAi )f(Yi − cAi )
X
δt + εAHi
8While the individual is sick, the health testing program would provide no valuable information.
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In this case, both income and the annual costs of the program will continue until the end
of the individual’s nominal life expectancy. However, there are no benefits in the form of
avoided illness-years, post-illness-years or lost life-years.
Present value of indirect utility, if the individual does not choose the program but does
suﬀer the illness, is given by:
PDV (V NSi ) = β0
X
δtf(Y ∗it) + β1
X
δt(Y ∗it)f(Y
∗
it) (3)
+α1
X
δtillAit + α2
X
δtrcvAit + α3
X
δtlylAit + ε
NS
i
Present value of indirect utility, if the individual does not choose the program and does not
suﬀer the illness, is:
PDV (V NHi ) = β0f (Yi)
X
δt + β1 (Yi) f (Yi)
X
δt + εNHi (4)
2.3 Expected Indirect Utility
Given the ex ante uncertainty about future health states, we need to calculate expected
utilities to derive the individual’s option price for any given program. In this case, the
expectation is taken across the binary uncertain outcome of getting sick, S, or remaining
healthy, H. The probability of illness or injury diﬀers according to whether the respondent
participates in the risk-reducing intervention program. Let the baseline probability of illness
be ΠNSi if the individual opts out of the program, and let the reduced probability be Π
AS
i if
the individual opts to participate in the program.
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Expected utility if the individual buys program A is:
E
£
PDV
¡
V Ai
¢¤
S,H
= ΠASi × PDV (V ASi ) +
¡
1−ΠASi
¢× PDV (V AHi )
Expected utility if the program is not purchased (i.e. “no program”, N) is:
E
£
PDV
¡
V Ni
¢¤
S,H
= ΠNSi × PDV (V NSi ) +
¡
1−ΠNSi
¢× PDV (V NHi )
We will make use of a number of notational abbreviations in presenting the expected utility
diﬀerence formula, E
£
PDV
¡
V Ai
¢¤
S,H
− E
£
PDV
¡
V Ni
¢¤
S,H
, to be discussed next. First,
the risk change due to program participation, ∆ΠASi =
¡
ΠASi −ΠNSi
¢
, is presumed to be
negative. Then, there are several distinct present discounted value terms to accommodate.
We abbreviate each of these as follows:
pdvcAi =
X
δt,
pdveAi =
X
δtpreAit, pdvi
A
i =
X
δtillAit
pdvrAi =
X
δtrcvAit , pdvl
A
i =
X
δtlylAit
The indicator variables for each health state are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, so
pdvci = pdvei + pdvii + pdvri + pdvli.
To accommodate the diﬀerent time profiles of income and program costs over the indi-
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vidual’s remaining lifespan, it is convenient to define five additional terms:
pdvyAi =
X
δt
¡
preAit + γ1ill
A
it + rcv
A
it + γ2lyl
A
it
¢
= pdveAi + γ1pdvi
A
i + pdvr
A
i + γ2pdvl
A
i
pdvpAi =
X
δt
¡
preAit + γ3ill
A
it + rcv
A
it + γ4lyl
A
it
¢
= pdvev + γ3pdvi
A
i + pdvr
A
i + γ4pdvl
A
i
pdvyyAi =
X
δt
¡
preAit + γ1ill
A
it + rcv
A
it + γ2lyl
A
it
¢2
= pdvev + γ21pdvi
A
i + pdvr
A
i + γ
2
2pdvl
A
i
pdvppAi =
X
δt
¡
preAit + γ3ill
A
it + rcv
A
it + γ4lyl
A
it
¢2
= pdveAi + γ
2
3pdvi
A
i + pdvr
A
i + γ
2
4pdvl
A
i
pdvypAi =
X
δt
⎡
⎢⎣
¡
preAit + γ1ill
A
it + rcv
A
it + γ2lyl
A
it
¢×¡
preAit + γ3ill
A
it + rcv
A
it + γ4lyl
A
it
¢
⎤
⎥⎦ = pdveAi +γ1γ3pdviAi +pdvrAi +γ2γ4pdvlAi
The expected utility diﬀerence driving the individual’s choice between Program A and the
“Neither Program” alternative can then be written as follows (there will be an analogous
utility diﬀerence for Program B versus the “Neither Program” alternative). This version
of the formula emphasizes that it is a quadratic form in annual program cost cAi . This is a
consequence of the manner in which we allow for a diminishing marginal utility of income
(via β1 6= 0).
E
£
PDV (V Ai )
¤
− E
£
PDV (V Ni )
¤
= A[cAi ]
2 +B[cAi ] + C + εi (5)
= [cAi ]
2
©
β1
£¡
1−ΠASi
¢
pdvcAi +Π
AS
i pdvpp
A
i
¤ª
£
cAi
¤ ⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
−β0
£¡
1−ΠASi
¢
pdvcAi +Π
AS
i pdvp
A
i
¤
−β12Yi
£¡
1−ΠASi
¢
pdvcAi +Π
AS
i pdvyp
A
i
¤
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
+
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
β0Yi∆Π
AS
i
¡
pdvyAi − pdvcAi
¢
+ β1Y
2
i ∆Π
AS
i
¡
pdvyyAi − pdvcAi
¢
+α1∆ΠASi pdvi
A
i + α2∆Π
AS
i pdvr
A
i + α3∆Π
AS
i pdvl
A
i + εi
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
For estimation using a conventional linear-index conditional logit multiple choice model,
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the terms must be rearranged into a form that isolates the five key parameters in the under-
lying indirect utility function:
E
£
PDV (V Ai )
¤
− E
£
PDV (V Ni )
¤
= (6)
β0
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
−
£
cAi
¤ £¡
1−ΠASi
¢
pdvcAi +Π
AS
i pdvp
A
i
¤
+Yi∆ΠASi
¡
pdvyAi − pdvcAi
¢
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
+β1
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
[cAi ]
2
£¡
1−ΠASi
¢
pdvcAi +Π
AS
i pdvpp
A
i
¤
−[cAi ] 2Yi
£¡
1−ΠASi
¢
pdvcAi +Π
AS
i pdvyp
A
i
¤
+Y 2i ∆Π
AS
i
¡
pdvyyAi − pdvcAi
¢
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
+α1
©
∆ΠASi pdvi
A
i
ª
+ α2
©
∆ΠASi pdvr
A
i
ª
+ α3
©
∆ΠASi pdvl
A
i
ª
+ εi
The five terms in braces in equation (6) can be constructed from the data, given an assump-
tion about the discount rate and the γ parameters that define the time profiles of income
and program costs. We estimate the five parameters β0, β1, α1, α2, and α3 in our base model
in our empirical illustration
2.4 From maximum annual payment to PDV of payment stream
The option price for the program is the common certain payment that makes the individual
just indiﬀerent between paying for the program and enjoying the risk reduction, or not
paying for the program and not enjoying the risk reduction. This annual option price, bcAi ,
will make E
£
PDV (V Ai )
¤
− E
£
PDV (V Ni )
¤
exactly zero. This amount of money bcAi is the
maximum constant annual payment that the individual will be willing to make, regardless of
whether he suﬀers the illness, in order to purchase the program that reduces his probability
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of suﬀering the illness from ΠNSi to Π
AS
i .
To simplify the exposition, although our empirical illustration involves a dimininishing
marginal utility of income, we will outline the special case where the marginal utility of
income does not depend upon the level of income (i.e. β1 = 0). The formulas are analogous,
but somewhat more complicated, when the marginal utility of income is non-constant. In
this special case, equation (5) reduces to be linear in cAi :
E
£
PDV (V Ai )
¤
−E
£
PDV (V Ni )
¤
(7)
= −
£
cAi
¤
β0
£¡
1−ΠASi
¢
pdvcAi +Π
AS
i pdvp
A
i
¤
+β0Yi∆Π
AS
i
¡
pdvyAi − pdvcAi
¢
+α1∆ΠASi pdvi
A
i + α2∆Π
AS
i pdvr
A
i + α3∆Π
AS
i pdvl
A
i + εi
Setting equation (7) equal to zero and solving for the implied value of bcAi yields
bcAi =
⎡
⎢⎣
β0Yi∆Π
AS
i
¡
pdvyAi − pdvcAi
¢
+α1∆ΠASi pdvi
A
i + α2∆Π
AS
i pdvr
A
i + α3∆Π
AS
i pdvl
A
i + εi
⎤
⎥⎦
β0 [(1−ΠASi ) pdvcAi +ΠASi pdvpAi ]
(8)
While the payment bcAi is the maximum annual payment the individual is willing to make,
these payments are necessary for the rest of the individual’s life, so the present value of
these payments must be calculated. In this context, however, there is some uncertainty over
just what will constitute “the rest of the individual’s life,” since this may diﬀer according
to whether the individual suﬀers the illness or not. We will use the expected present value
of this time profile of costs, with the expectation taken over whether or not the individual
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suﬀers the illness when they are participating in the program.
E
h
PV ( bcAi )i = ¡1−ΠASi ¢ ( bcAi )pdvcAi + ¡ΠASi ¢ ( bcAi )pdvpAi (9)
= ( bcAi ) £¡1−ΠASi ¢ pdvcAi +ΠASi ¡pdvpAi ¢¤
In this simplified case where the marginal utility of income is constant, capitalizing forward
this payment in equation (8) over the rest of the individual’s life by multiplying by the
probability-weighted average of pdvcAi and pdvp
A
i allows this term to cancel the identical
term in the denominator of equation (8). If we also factor out ∆ΠASi from the numerator of
equation (8), the formula for the present value of the stream of annual maximum payments
willingly made to avoid a specified degraded health profile therefore reduces to:
E
h
PV ( bcAi )i (10)
= ∆ΠASi
∙
Yi
¡
pdvyAi − pdvcAi
¢
+
α1
β0
pdviAi +
α2
β0
pdvrAi +
α3
β0
pdvlAi + εi
¸
If the marginal utility of income is constant across the population, therefore, the expected
present value of the lifetime stream of maximum annual payments is merely proportional to
the size of the risk reduction, given individual preferences, income and the illness profile in
question.9 In our more general specification (i.e. allowing for diminishing marginal utility
9The assumption of strict proportionality between willingness to pay and the size of the risk reduction
is typically maintained in order to construct the Value of a Statistical Life. If the risk reduction involved,
and the cost of the program, pertained only to a single year (as is the case in most VSL studies) there
would be no diﬀerence between pdvyi and pdvci, so that the first term inside the square brackets in equation
(10) would disappear. If all illness profiles were to be treated as identical, all of the terms involving our
diﬀerentiated α parameters would collapse into a single constant parameter, α, multiplying by a dummy
variable, say DAi , that indicates whether the health state occurs in alternative A. This new parameter would
describe the marginal utility of the generic health outcome to be avoided. For most existing studies this
health outcome is ”sudden death this year.” In this case, we would have just a single point estimate of the
option price that would be proportional to the size of the risk change due to the program:
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of income via β1 6= 0) the formulas are somewhat more complex because equation (5) is
quadratic in cAi , rather than conveniently linear in c
A
i .
2.5 Value of a statistical illness (VSI)
The option price that we estimate represents a willingness to pay to reduce an illness-specific
risk that jointly determines several health state outcomes, not just the mortality outcomes
upon which a conventional VSL is based. To convert our expected present-value option price
to the “value of a statistical illness” (VSI), we normalize arbitrarily on a 1.00 risk change by
dividing this WTP by the absolute size of the risk reduction.10 Use the same abbreviations
B and C for the detailed expressions defined in equation (5), but consider again the simpler
case where the marginal utility of income is simply a constant (β1 = 0) so that A = 0. If the
researcher desires measures of a quantity that is comparable to traditional VSL estimates,
the eﬀective formula for the value of a statistical illness will be
V SI =
E
h
PV ( bcAi )i
|∆ΠASi |
=
C
£¡
1−ΠASi
¢
pdvcAi +Π
AS
i
¡
pdvpAi
¢¤
B |∆ΠASi |
(11)
E
h
PV (ccAi )i = ∆ΠASi β−10 £αDAi ¤
= (α/β0)∆Π
AS
i to avoid death (D
A
i = 1)
= 0 for ”no program,” where (DAi = 0)
10In our study, all the probability changes ∆ΠASi are negative, while the absolute magnitude of these
changes will be positive. The ratios that result, ∆ΠASi /
¯¯
∆ΠASi
¯¯
, will amount to multiplying by -1, which
will change the eﬀective sign on each of the terms involving this ratio.
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In this special case, the formula for VSI simplifies to
V SI = YipdvlAi −
α1
β0
pdviAi −
α2
β0
pdvrAi −
α3
β0
pdvlAi −
εi
β0 |∆ΠASi |
(12)
where we take advantage of the fact that pdvyAi +pdvl
A
i = pdvc
A
i so that
¡
pdvyAi − pdvcAi
¢
=
−pdvlAi .
How does the magnitude of the estimated VSI vary with changes in it components? In
this simple model with a constant marginal utility of income, increases in income Yi will
increase the predicted point estimate of the V SI. The eﬀect of income on V SIAi is given
by ∂V SIAi /∂Yi = pdvl
A
i , which is non-negative. The eﬀect of an increase in income on the
predicted V SI will be larger (i.) as more life-years are lost and (ii.) as the individual is
older, so that life-years lost come sooner in time.11
The V SI will also will depend upon the diﬀerent marginal utilities of avoided periods of
illness, post-illness status, and premature death. It will also depend upon the time profiles for
each of these states as embedded in the terms pdviAi , pdvr
A
i , and pdvl
A
i , and (implicit in this
model) upon the individual’s own discount rate.12 This heterogeneity can be accommodated
by making the indirect utility parameters α1, α2, and α3 depend upon other individual
11Nothing in this specification precludes negative point estimates of the V SI. The key undiscounted
marginal utility parameters are not presently constrained to be strictly positive (for income) and strictly
negative (for episodes of undesirable health profiles). This is especially a concern when these marginal utilities
are permitted to vary systematically with of the attributes of the illness profile and/or the characteristics of
the individual in question. The marginal utility of income, the scalar parameter β in our simplest models,
bears a point estimate that is robustly positive, but positive values for the important systematically varying
parameters capturing the marginal utility of an illness-year (α1) or a lost life-year (α3) can push an individual
fitted value of the VSI for a particular morbidity/mortality profile, for a respondent of a particular age, into
the negative range.
12Subsequent work will preserve individual discount rates as systematically varying parameters that depend
upon respondent characteristics. In a separate subsample for our survey, we elicited choices that allow us
to infer individual specific discount rates. Here, however, discount rates are presumed to be exogenous and
constant across individuals although our empirical analyses explores the senstivity of our results to diﬀerent
discount rates.
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characteristics.13
The error term ε above is assumed to be identically distributed across observations in
a manner appropriate for conditional logit estimation. Given the transformation needed to
solve for the V SI, however, the error term in the V SI formula will be heteroscedastic, with
smaller error variances corresponding to cases with larger absolute risk reductions,
¯¯
∆ΠASi
¯¯
.
2.6 VSIs versus Conventional VSLs
In our framework, the VSL is but one possible variant of the more general concept of the
VSI. To isolate the VSL associated with particular illness, one would assume death in the
current year, with no period of illness or post-illness status. The remainder of the individual’s
nominal life expectancy would be experienced as lost life-years. Since the terms in pdviAi
and pdvrAi will be zero, our analog to the conventional VSL formula in the simplified case
where the marginal utility of income is a constant (β1 = 0), will be:
E[V SL] =
¯¯
∆ΠASi
¯¯−1
E
h
PV ( bcAi )i = µYi − α3β0
¶
pdvlAi (13)
where pdvlAi =
X
δtlylAit .
The summation in the formula for pdvlAi is from the present until the end of the individ-
ual’s nominal life expectancy. This interval depends upon the individual’s current age, so
even in a model with homogeneous preferences, the VSI will vary with age. The term α3/β0
is the monetized disutility of a lost life-year. We assume that avoiding a lost life-year means
avoiding disutility equivalent to this amount of money (which accounts for the negative sign)
13For example, illness characteristics can be expected to shift the value of α1, the marginal (dis)utility of
a sick-year, and possibly the marginal utility of each period in the post-illness state, α2, since the type of
illness may connote the degree of ”health” that nominal recovery from that illness actually implies. Also,
the marginal utility of a lost life-year may depend upon the health state prior to death. Many of these
dimensions of heterogeneity will be explored in detail in subsequent papers.
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and preserving future income.
2.7 Calculating Policy-Relevant VSIs
The fitted VSIs that we will estimate are based on the sets of illness attributes generated for
the choice experiment rather than those actually associated with specific illnesses. Therefore,
the distribution of our fitted VSIs cannot be expected to match the actual distribution of
VSIs in the general population that faces a real range of illness profiles. To be clear on what
is needed to construct fitted VSIs using our present results, we oﬀer the following checklist
of needs and tasks:
1. For the illness in question: An approximate joint distribution for the ill-
ness profile (possible ages of onset, possible reductions in lifespans, and possible
outcomes (recovery, sudden death, limited morbidity, chronic morbidity). In
practice, this joint distribution will be constructed using expert judgment and
its validity will in part determine the validity of the eventual VSI estimates our
model will produce.
2. For the population aﬀected by this health threat: An approximate joint distri-
bution of age, gender, and income level. The distribution of these characteristics
may be based on expert judgment combined with exposure and epidemiological
data. Again, the validity of the assumptions underlying this approximate joint
distribution will in part determine the validity of the resulting VSI estimates.
3. Make a large number of random draws from the joint distribution of illness
profiles and aﬀected population characteristics and combine these illness profiles
and individual characteristics with our formulas for the value of a statistical
illness.
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6. Build up a sampling distribution for the implied VSIs. The mean of this
distribution can be interpreted as our model’s prediction about the average of
VSIs for this type of health threat aﬀecting this particular population.
The overall Value of a Statistical Illness, estimated in this fashion and calculated for a
given policy by simulation methods, will allow the researcher to more fully capture the policy
choice context for the risk in question.
3 Survey Methods and Data
Market data that adequately illustrate how individuals allocated risk mitigation expenditure
across competing risks and across their remaining years of life are not available.14 Therefore,
we have conducted a survey of over 2400 randomly chosen adults in the United States.
The centerpiece of the survey is a conjoint choice experiment that presents individuals with
specific illness profiles and programs that mitigated these illness risks. In this section we
briefly describe the five modules of this survey instrument. (Appendix A provides one
example of a choice set from the primary survey instrument.15)
The first module evaluates the individual’s subjective risk assessment of the major ill-
nesses they face, their familiarity with each illness, and current mitigating and averting
behavior they may be undertaking. The second module consists of a tutorial that intro-
14Most market data characterize at best only one source of risk (e.g. hedonic wage data) and are often
missing essential variables such as the baseline risk, risk reduction, the latency of the programs or the costs of
programs. For example, using the Health and Retirement Survey, Picone, Sloan and Taylor (2004) expertly
explored how time preferences, expected longevity and other demand shifters aﬀect individuals’ propensity
to get mammograms, pap-smears and regular breast self-exams. However missing data on program costs,
baseline risks, and latency of program benefits prevented a fuller demand analysis.
15Readers who wish to peruse the actual survey instrument used for this study may access and example at:
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/˜cameron/vsl/DeShazo Cameron Private Survey US example.pdf . An anno-
tated version is available at http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/˜cameron/vsl/Annotated survey DeShazo Cameron.pdf
.
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duces individuals to the idea of an illness profile and programs that may manage these
illness-specific risks.
Each illness profile is a description of a time sequence of health states associated with a
major illness that the individual is described as facing with some probability over the course
of his or her lifetime. The attributes of the illness profiles are randomly varied, subject to
some plausibility constraints for each illness type.16 We summarize the key attribute levels
employed in our choice set in Table 1. The first row in this table presents the frequency with
which each of the twelve illnesses appeared in the choice sets. Up to eleven attributes charac-
terize each illness profile and program, although we concentrate on just the main attributes
in this paper.17 In terms of the number and type of attributes, our design is comparable
to existing state of the art health valuation studies (Viscusi et al., 1991; O’Connor and
Blomquist, 1997; Sloan et al., 1998; Johnson, et al., 2000). However, unlike some studies, we
choose not to give individuals extensive background information on illnesses that might make
one illness risk appear more salient than others. We seek to estimate demand conditional on
the individual’s ex ante information set.18
There are several reasons why we choose to include illness labels as an attribute. As shown
in Table 1 these labels include prostate cancer, breast cancer, colon cancer, skin cancer, lung
cancer, heart disease (i.e., heart attack, angina), stroke (e.g., blood clot, aneurysm), respira-
tory diseases (i.e., asthma, bronchitis, emphysema) as well as diabetes and Alzheimer’s. A
16We took great care to try to ensure individuals did not reject the scenario because it was implausible
(e.g., one does not recover from Alzheimer’s or die suddenly from diabetes). See the on-line Appendix A for
more details.
17These illness profiles included the illness name, the age of onset, medical treatments, duration and level
of pain and disability, and a description of the outcome of the illness. Our selection of these attributes was
guided by a focus on those attributes that 1) most aﬀected the utility of individuals and 2) spanned all the
illnesses that individuals evaluated (Moxey et al. 2003).
18Prior to the choice experiments, we ask individuals questions about their subjective assessment of: 1)
various background environmental risks, 2) their risk of each illness, 3) their personal experience with illness,
and 4) the experience of friends and family with each illness.
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major advantage of using these labels is that our pre-testing showed that individuals think
in terms of specific illnesses when identifying hereditary risks and when planning for the
mitigation of future risks. Second, the inclusion of the twelve major illnesses meant that our
estimates of the marginal utility of avoiding a year of morbidity and premature mortality
were broadly representative of the leading lifetime illness risks. Finally, including diverse
illnesses enabled us to motivate a wide range of health outcomes, (e.g., some associated with
sudden death (heart attack and stroke) and others associated with chronic morbidity (such
as diabetes and Alzheimer’s disease)).19 The major disadvantage of specific illness names is
that individuals may implicitly assume the presence of attributes that we did not explicitly
include in the illness profile description.20
After presenting an illness profile, we next explain to individuals that they could pur-
chase a new program that would be coming on the market that would reduce their risk of
experiencing specific illnesses over current and future periods of their life. These programs
are described as involving annual diagnostic testing and, if needed, associated drug therapies
and recommended life-style changes. We choose this class of interventions because pretest-
ing showed that individuals view this combination of programs (diagnostic tests, followed by
drug therapies) as feasible, potentially eﬀective and familiar for a wide range of illnesses.21
The eﬀectiveness of these programs is described in four ways: 1) graphically, with a risk grid,
2) in terms of risk probabilities, 3) in terms of measures of relative risk reduction across the
19Gender specific illnesses (e.g., breast and prostate cancer) are chosen to comport with the respondent’s
gender. We aggregated some illness labels based on the cognitive labels individuals used in our pretests.
These included heart disease (i.e., heart attack, angina), stroke (e.g., blood clot, aneurysm), and respiratory
diseases (i.e., asthma, bronchitis, emphysema). Each of these illnesses was described in greater detail in its
illness profile.
20In empirical analysis, one could address this potential disadvantage by using illness-specific dummy
variables to control for these eﬀects. We reserve these considerably more-complex models for a subsequent
paper.
21Depending upon their gender and age individuals were familiar with comparable diagnostic tests such
as mammograms, pap smears and prostrate exams, or the new C-reactive protein tests for heart disease.
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two illness profiles and 4) as a qualitative textual description of the risk reductions (Corso
et al., 1999; Krupnick et al., 2000). The payment vehicle for each program is presented as
a co-payment that would have to be paid by the respondent for as long as the diagnostic
testing and medication are needed.22 For the sake of concreteness we ask respondents to
assume that these payments would be needed for the remainder of their life span unless they
actually experienced that illness.23
We implement several measures to avoid potential biases.24 First, at the beginning of
this survey section, we include a “cheap talk” reminder to ensure that respondents carefully
consider their budget constraint and to discourage them from overstating their willingness to
pay (Cummings and Taylor, 1999; List, 2001).25 Second, we carefully explain to individuals
that they can choose neither program. We also point out several possible explanations
why reasonable people might choose neither program in some cases.26 If individuals choose
“neither program,” we assume that they prefer their status quo illness profile to either
of the costly illness-reducing programs. We obtain a great deal of information on each
individual’s status quo health profile that enables us to characterize his or her future health
state expectations.27
22Costs were expressed in both monthly and annual terms.
23As result of respondents’ experience with co-payments and finely designed insurance premiums for dif-
ferent levels of service, focus group subjects found this annual cost assumption entirely plausible.
24Targeted biases include hypothetical and incentive compatibility biases as well as yea-saying behavior.
Other biases that we address are discussed in the on-line Appendix 1; these include order and sequencing
eﬀects, Weber’s law in risk perception and various framing and anchoring concerns.
25This screen began “In surveys like this one, people sometimes do not fully consider their future expenses.
Please think about what you would have to give up to purchase one of these programs. If you choose a
program with too high a price, you may not be able to aﬀord the program when it is oﬀered. . . ” (form
22-private). See online Appendix A for a complete description of this section.
26These reasons include that they 1) cannot aﬀord either program, 2) did not believe they faced these
illness risks, 3) would rather spend the money on other things, 4) believed they would be aﬀected by another
illness first. If the individual did choose neither program we ask them why they did so in a follow-up question.
27We elicited individuals’ subject risk levels for illness as well as their age when each illness risk would
be a threat to their life. We also elicited their subjective life expectancy, documented their current health
status with respect to over 16 illnesses and evaluated their current risk averting and mitigating activities.
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The third module contains the five main choice sets, each oﬀering the individual two
programs that reduced the risk of two distinct illness profiles.28 Presenting individuals with
a large array of illness risks has advantages and disadvantages. The greatest advantage is that
individuals consider a more-complete choice set, allowing us to observe how they substitute
across programs associated with these competing illness risks. Second, presenting a range
of major illnesses increases the representativenss of our estimates and makes the motivation
of a fuller range of illness profiles plausible, and thus possible. One disadvantage is that
this format, in conjunction with survey length and time limitations, limits that background
information that we can provide about each illness. A second potential disadvantage is the
cognitive complexity associated with the choice task, which we seek to minimize through the
survey design and evaluate ex post.29
The fourth module contains various debriefing questions that are used to document the
individual’s status quo health profile and to cross-check the validity of the responses (Baron
and Ubel, 2002). Module five was administered separately from the choice experiment. It
collects a detailed medical history of the individual, as well as household socioeconomic
information.
We need this information on the individual’s status quo health profile to fully interpret individuals’ stated
choices.
28To avoid potential order eﬀects, we were careful to ask individuals to evaluate each pair of alternatives
independent of previous choice sets (Ubel et al., 2002; de Bruin and Keren, 2003). Our empirical evaluation
showed that the first four choice sets appeared largely free of order eﬀects. Individuals did exhibit a slightly
higher propensity to select a program from the last choice set.
29We sought to minimize cognitive complexity through careful survey design. We also assess this concern
directly in the survey. After each choice set we ask individuals how diﬃcult each choice had been. On a scale
of 1 to 5 (very easy to very diﬃcult), the average response for the first choice set was 3.2. This rating fell
with each subsequent choice set, suggesting that the choice task became easier with increasing familiarity.
23
3.1 Sample Characteristics and Scope Tests
The development of this survey instrument involved 36 cognitive interviews, three pretests
(n=100 each) and an unusually large pilot study (n=1,400).30 Knowledge Networks admin-
istered the final version of the demand survey and the health-profile survey to a sample of
2439 of their panelists.31 Respondents were paid an incentive for completing the survey.32
Our response rate for those panelists contacted was 79 percent. For these respondents, there
were 11,717 choices, although only 7,520 choices (22,560 alternatives) were deemed admissi-
ble for estimation. Appendix Table B1 compares the individuals in our estimating sample
with corresponding population characteristics (e.g., age, income, and gender) from the 2000
Decennial Census.33 Among the full set of 11,717 choices, 332 were excluded because an
undetected error our randomization algorithm produced for one of the illness profiles in the
choice set the characteristic that the illness would slightly prolong the individual’s life span.
While this is perhaps remotely possible, we elect to exclude these choices as having been
potentially confusing to respondents. A further 2,236 choices were excluded because the
respondent selected “Neither Program” and indicated as the only explanation “I did not
believe the programs would work.” This is clear evidence of scenario rejection. If any other
(economic) reason was given, we retained the choice. Finally, we excluded 1,629 choices
because the individual failed to answer correctly the simple risk comprehension question at
30We thank Vic Adamowicz, Richard Carson, Maureen Cropper, Baruch Fischhoﬀ, Jim Hammitt, Alan
Krupnick, and V. Kerry Smith for their careful reviews of the second of four versions of this instrument.
31Respondents are recruited in the Knowledge Network sample from standard RDD techniques. They
are then equipped with WebTV technology that enables them to receive and answer our surveys. More
information about Knowledge Networks is available from their website: www.knowlegdenetworks.com.
32Respondents were paid 10 dollars for completing our survey, in addition to the usual benefits of Knowl-
edge Networks panel membership.
33Although our sample characteristics are generally representative of the US population, we also con-
trol for systematic survey participation in our empirical analysis described in Section 4. Our re-
sponse/nonrespondent model to predict survey participation propensities uses data on Knowledge Networks’
initial RDD panel recruitment sample.
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the end of the survey’s risk tutorial.34
To evaluate construct validity of the study, we explore whether individual choices are
sensitive to the scope of the illness profile and risk-mitigating program (Hammitt and Gra-
ham, 1999; Yeung et al., 2003). In Models 1 and 2 in Table 2, we show using a simple ad
hoc conjoint choice analysis that individuals were highly sensitive to changes in the scope or
level of our central attributes. These attributes include the two most crucial attributes of
the program, its cost and the size of the risk reduction, as well as the two most important
dimensions of the illness profiles, the number of years spent in a morbid condition, and the
number of lost life-years. As will be the case for all models presented in this paper, these
estimates are obtained using a fixed eﬀects conditional logit estimator.35
4 Empirical Analysis
In our empirical analysis, we first illustrate the new types of demand information that our
model yields by estimating the marginal utilities of avoiding a year in each of our three unde-
sirable health states. We show how these marginal utilities may be combined with sequences
of health states to construct what is essentially a continuum of statistical illness profiles and
their associated utility consequences. Second, we show that the empirical evidence concern-
ing individuals’ demand behavior warrants the generalizations that we entertain. We do this
by demonstrating within our structural model that when choosing risk reducing programs,
individuals substitute across illness risks and also appear to substitute intertemporally across
their remaining lifespans.
34We believe these to be the minimal a priori justifiable exclusions from the estimating sample. Sensitivity
analyses with respect to these successive sample exclusions are provided in Appendix B2, available from the
authors. By far the greatest diﬀerence in results stems from the scenario rejection criterion.
35We use the clogit algorithm in Stata 8, with groups defined as the individual making the choice, and up
to five choices per individual when all conjoint choice questions were answered.
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4.1 Marginal Utility of a Health-State Year
We begin this analysis by estimating the marginal utility of year spent in each of three health
states: morbidity, a post-illness state, and a lost life-year. We also explore interactions
between years of morbidity and lost life years in order to assess the assumption of additive
separability that characterizes our most basic model. Using the implied marginal rates of
substitution between illness profiles and money, we then construct individual measures of
willingness to pay to avoid five archetypical illness profiles: 1) shorter-term morbidity with
recovery, 2) longer-term morbidity with recovery, 3) a combination of short term morbidity
and mortality, 4) a combination of longer-term morbidity and mortality and 5) immediate
mortality. Our underlying structural model requires (for now) that we make assumptions
about individuals’ time preferences and future expected income levels. Thus, in Section 4.2,
we explore how our implied V SIs vary systematically with these two factors.
Our basic structural model, which assumes homogeneous preferences (except for income
diﬀerences), takes the form presented in equation (6), and produces the five parameter
estimates shown as Model 3 in Table 2. These homogenous-preferences specifications are
estimated without sign restrictions and show robust significance and the expected signs on
all five primary parameters.36 The marginal utility of income is positive, but declines with
the level of income (yet does not go negative within the range of incomes in our sample).
The marginal utilities of sick-years, post-illness years, and lost life-years are all negative and
very strongly significantly diﬀerent from zero.37 While simple intuition might suggest that
death should be “worse” than illness and recovery, it is important to keep in mind that the
36Not surprisingly, the additional structure in Model 3, as opposed to Models 1 and 2, produces a lower
maximized value of the log-likelihood function. This is a common tradeoﬀ. The structure is required for a
rigorous utility-theoretic interpretation of the results, but the ad hoc model provides a better fit to the data.
37A positive marginal utility associated with a lost life-year might be expected only when the illness is
question constitutes a ”fate worse than death.”
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units involved are years in each health state. The relatively large (dis)utility associated with
recovered state probably reflects the general seriousness of the illnesses our survey describes.
(For example, respondents seem not to interpret being recovered from lung cancer, heart
attack, or respiratory disease as being equivalent to the pre-illness state.)
We now relax the maintained hypothesis in Model 3 that the marginal utilities from
each state are independent of the duration of that state and the durations of other health
states that characterize the profile in question. Our original model was developed in terms of
the individual’s undiscounted per-period indirect utility, where current-period health status
is captured only by a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive dummy variables. At the
moment of the individual’s program choice, however, each alternative is likely to be perceived
in terms of the present value of the sequence of future health states it represents. These
present values reflect the mix of health states in each illness profile. It is therefore reasonable
to take as a starting point for our choice models the indirect utility expressions such as
PDV (V ASi ) in equation (2). If these present discounted values capture the relevant attributes
of each alternative in the individual’s choice set, we can consider richer models that allow for
diminishing, rather than constant, marginal utilities from present discounted health-state
years, and for interactions between the numbers of present discounted years in diﬀerent
health states. In contrast, Model 3 constrains the marginal utility of each health state to
be constant and imposes a constant marginal rate of substitution between diﬀerent health-
state-years.
The final line in the estimating specification in equation (6), α1∆ΠASi pdvii+α2∆Π
AS
i pdvri+
α3∆ΠASi pdvli, can easily be adapted to be non-linear in pdvi
A
i , pdvr
A
i , and pdvl
A
i . We first
factor out the common ∆ΠASi term. Then original form of the term involving the present
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discounted health states is:
∆ΠASi
©
α1pdviAi + α2pdvr
A
i + α3pdvl
A
i
ª
(14)
We then shift each present discounted health-state term by one unit to accommodate the
absence of some health states in some health profiles. Then we take logarithms. The resulting
alternative logarithmic form for the final term in equation (6) is:
∆ΠASi
©
α1 log
¡
pdviAi + 1
¢
+ α2 log
¡
pdvrAi + 1
¢
+ α3 log
¡
pdvlAi + 1
¢ª
(15)
Estimates for this form are presented as Model 4 (presented in Table 3), which produces an
improvement in the log-likelihood function compared to the linear and additively separable
structural specification in Model 3. This implies diminishing marginal utility in avoided
present discounted degraded health-state years.
Model 5 then illustrates the consequences of allowing the parameters of the model to
vary according to the fitted probability that each respondent appears in our estimating sam-
ple. Full-fledged selectivity correction models in multiple-choice conditional logit models are
complex, so we do not attempt them in this paper, although we do estimate a response/non-
response model that produces fitted response probabilities for each individual in our sample.38
Only the coeﬃcient on the lost life-years term diﬀers significantly with the fitted probability
that the respondent shows up in our estimating sample. The greater the probability of being
38Our selection model takes the over 525,000 original random-digit dialed recruiting contacts for the
Knowledge Networks panel and fits a probit model to explain the presence or absence of each household in
our final estimating sample. As explanatory variables, we use a set of 15 orthogonal factors derived from
a factor analysis of over 100 census tract characteristics, county voting records, county mortality from each
major disease over the previous decade as a fraction of 2000 census population, and the number of hospitals
in the same census tract(s) as the address (or telephone exchange) of the contacted household. Discussion
of this response/nonresponse model constitutes a separate manuscript, currently under preparation.
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in our sample, relative to the mean probability, the lesser the disutility the individual ap-
pears to experience from a percentage increase in discounted lost life-years. While the shift
is statistically significant, comparison of Model 5 and Model 4 reveals that the diﬀerence in
the magnitude of this key coeﬃcient across these two specifications is minimal. We employ
diﬀerences from the mean response probability so that the estimated utility parameters cor-
respond to the simulated case where all response probabilities are exactly equal to the mean
(i.e. identical response probabilities across the entire sample).
Of course, whenever a linear-in-logs form is a better predictor of consumer choices than
a linear form, the researcher is typically inclined to explore even more general logarithmic
forms. In particular, the translog form represents a second-order local approximation to any
arbitrary functional relationship. This form is fully quadratic in all of the log terms and
their pairwise interactions. We have explored the inclusion of all three squared terms and all
three interaction terms. Only the squared term in pdvlAi and the interaction term between
pdviAi and pdvl
A
i are robustly significant. This more general specification is presented as
Model 6. Again, it produces a substantial improvement in the log-likelihood. The estimates
suggest that the disutility of an additional discounted lost life-year shrinks as the number
of discounted lost life-years increases. They also suggest that the disutility of an additional
discounted lost life-year is reduced by increases in the number of discounted illness-years
that precede it.
In this application, however, there is a further complication. The illness profiles that were
eligible to be considered by each respondent were constrained by the respondent’s current
age. No respondent considered illnesses that could strike at an age younger than their
current age, so current age defines the maximum duration of any illness profile. The result is
a degree of multicollinearity between the respondent’s remaining nominal life expectancy and
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the range of sick-years, post-illness years, and lost life-years they were eligible to consider. In
particular, when including interactions between the pdviAi terms and the pdvl
A
i terms, large
values of these interaction terms were closely associated with the youth of the respondent.
It is not possible to include current age as a factor that might have an additively separable
eﬀect on the individual’s level of utility, since terms such as these drop out of the utility-
diﬀerence calculation across alternatives. To control for the eﬀect of current age on the
apparent marginal utility of each health state, we need to allow current age, agei0, to shift
the marginal utility parameters. An intermediate model, not shown in Table 3, assessed the
consequences of allowing agei0 to shift only the coeﬃcients on each of the linear terms in
the logs of discounted years in each adverse health state. Each of the additional coeﬃcients,
α11, α21, and α31, was statistically significant. Older respondents appear to anticipate lesser
disutility from discounted sick-years and discounted lost life-years, but greater disutility from
discounted post-illness years.
The specification with just linear age eﬀects on the linear-in-logarithms terms in dis-
counted health-state years produces a substantial improvement in the log-likelihood function,
but leads to some odd simulation results when we use the parameter estimates to predict
VSIs for specific illness profiles. Our recourse is to allow all of the translog coeﬃcients to vary
systematically with agei0 and age2i0 since earlier empirical research has suggested the pres-
ence of quadratic age eﬀects in V SLs.39 The age shifters on the sick-years and post-illness
years terms (pdviAi and pdvr
A
i ) become statistically insignificant. However, the presence of
significant quadratic-in-age shifters on the linear and quadratic lost life-years terms (pdvlAi )
and on the interaction between the pdviAi term and the pdvl
A
i term, prevents counter-intuitive
negative fitted VSI estimates for some illness profiles for young respondents. Therefore, we
39See for example Jones-Lee et al. (993) or Krupnick et al. (2002).
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prefer the specification presented as Model 7 in Table 3, even though two coeﬃcients (on the
level and linear age eﬀects on the interaction between the pdviAi and pdvl
A
i terms) are not
individually statistically significant.
For Model 7, if we simulate identical response probabilities for all participants, the final
term in equation (6) is specified as follows:
+∆ΠASi
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(α10) log
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¢
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¡
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¢
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¢¤2
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£
log
¡
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¢¤ £
log
¡
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¢¤
⎫
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⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(16)
To our knowledge, these are the first attempts to estimate the age-varying marginal utilities
of avoiding a present discounted year of morbidity and a present discounted lost life-year
within a common model. We evaluate the validity of our estimates by assessing whether they
vary systematically in a manner that economic theory or simple intuition would predict.40
We examine next how these estimates vary with assumptions about average time preferences,
as well as with the data concerning each individual’s income, and with current age and disease
latency.
40The only other ordinal utility measure expressed per year is the concept of the value of a statistical life
year. However, this is not a measure of marginal utility, rather it is constructed by dividing a VSL estimate
by the remaining number of expected life-years.
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4.2 Statistical Illness Profiles with Varying Time Preferences and
Income
We now employ the estimated parameters reported for Model 7 in Table 3 to characterize the
Value of a Statistical Illness (VSI) associated with selected combinations of years of morbid-
ity, years in post-illness status, and years of premature mortality. For illustrative purposes,
we examine five representative illness profiles: 1) a period of shorter-term morbidity followed
by recovery, 2) a period of longer-term morbidity followed by recovery, 3) a combination of
shorter-term morbidity followed by premature mortality, 4) a combination of longer-term
morbidity followed by premature mortality, and 5) immediate mortality.
Our models currently require that the researcher specify each individual’s time prefer-
ences. In Table 4, we consider an individual who is now 45 years old with an income of
$42,000 and calculate the fitted VSI (in millions of dollars) for each of five illness profiles to
illustrate the sensitivity of our models to our choice of discount rate. In Table 3, the results
for Model 7 were derived under the assumption that r = 0.05. The middle column of Table
4 shows the medians and 90% ranges of simulated point estimates of the VSI for our five dif-
ferent illness profiles assuming a current age of 45 and immediate onset.41 The first and third
columns of results in Table 4 are produced by re-estimating Model 7 having constructed the
present discounted value terms using two alternative discounting assumptions: r = 0.03, and
r = 0.07. Table 4 shows that fitted VSI estimates vary inversely with the assumed discount
rate. For our 45-year-old, the case of sudden death (most common in the conventional VSL
context) the 5% discount rate produces a VSI of roughly $4.5 million, whereas the median
41These simulations are taken across 1000 draws from the joint distribution of the estimated parameters.
We acknowledge that the mean of the theoretical distribution of a ratio of asymptotically normal quantities
is undefined. However, we present finite-sample medians and 90% ranges to convey a sense of the precision
of the parameter estimates and the implications of this precision for fitted VSIs.
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estimates for 3% and 7% rates and about $5.5 million and $3.8 million.
Table 5 reverts to a discount rate of r = 0.05 and again reports the results of simulating
VSIs for an individual who is now 45 years old and faces each of our five representative
illness profiles with immediate onset. The middle column reproduces the results for our
baseline income of $42,000. The first and third columns demonstrate the sensitivity of VSIs
to income levels. We arbitrarily select alternative income levels of $25,000 and $67,500 for
illustration.42 As expected, VSI is larger when income is greater. For our 45-year-old and
the case of sudden death, the fitted median VSI at $25,000 income is only about $3.5 million,
whereas the fitted median VSI at $67,500 income is $7.0 million.
Table 6 explores the eﬀect of illness latency on willingness to pay to avoid health risks.
In this table, we array the five diﬀerent illness profiles across the top of the table. In the
body of the table, we display fitted median VSI estimates and 90% ranges for one respon-
dent aged 35 now and another aged 65 now. The age at onset of each illness is varied to
include immediate onset, as well as onset at decade intervals starting five years from now.
Considerable variability is present. Focusing again on the sudden death scenario, our model
suggests that the 65-year-old respondents are willing to pay less to avoid sudden death than
the 35-year-old respondent. Looking forward, however, both individuals are willing to pay
less to avoid the same illness profile when it commences at a later age. Our model allows
VSIs to reflect the duration of each type of health state. The numbers of prospective sick-
years and life-years lost can be expected to have a substantial eﬀect on willingness-to-pay to
avoid each illness profile.
As a more detailed summary of the eﬀect of the respondent’s age now on the VSI for
42These corresponding roughly to the 25th percentile and median of the household income distribution
according to the 2000 Census ($25,000 and $42,000), as well as for the 75th percentile of individual income
for our sample ($65,000).
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sudden death, we oﬀer Figure 1, which shows the simulated median and 90% confidence
interval for this fitted VSI as a function of age now. As the term in (16) indicates, age has
an nonlinear eﬀect on several of the parameters of the model. The combined influence of
these three diﬀerent types of quadratic age eﬀects on the fitted VSI for this particular illness
profile is captured by Figure 1. Figure 2 illustrates one other possible illness profile. In this
case, it is an illness that lasts five years, ending in death, but with ten years of latency prior
to onset. Willingness to pay to avoid this illness profile also diﬀers systematically with age.
When evaluating the social benefits of a policy change that alters the incidence of a
particular illness, there are great advantages to being able to estimate the continuum of
statistical illness profiles associated with that particular illness. Our approach oﬀers the
flexibility to evaluate changes in the type, future timing, and duration of heterogeneous
illness profiles. Additionally, it does so within a consistent theoretical and empirical model,
rather than requiring researchers to cobble together estimates for current period morbidity
and mortality from separate valuation methods and studies.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Unlike many previous empirical eﬀorts to measure willingness to pay to reduce mortality
risks, our model does not produce a single best estimate or confidence interval for the Value
of a Statistical Life (VSL) for use in all policy contexts. Instead, our model is best understood
as a generalization of the standard single-period, single-risk valuation model. It explicitly
allows the individual to allocate risks across multiple future time periods. Across those
multiple periods, it allows for an explicit and very general treatment of future income streams,
costs streams, probabilistic benefits, and time preferences. Importantly, it also allows for
substitution across competing sources of risks and more completely characterizes the type
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and duration of health outcome results from those risks. Rather than focusing on only
a single risk of death in the current period, the model takes as its objects of choice a
continuum of future health-state years. These generalizations may mitigate several sources
of bias associated with single-period, single-risk analyses.
Although the model is a generalization, it nonetheless produces a new and important type
of economic information: distinct estimates of the marginal utilities of avoiding a year of
morbidity and a lost life year within a single model. It appears that these marginal utilities
are not simple constants. From these heterogeneous marginal values, which appear to depend
upon the current age of the respondent and the mix of health states in an illness profile, we
have illustrated how to construct the values for a full range of statistical illness. This may
significantly enhance the construct validity of previous measures of demand used in public
policy analysis. Estimates such as these may diminish the need for policy analysts to piece
together disparate estimates morbidity and mortality from diﬀerent valuation methods. To
further enhance program and policy evaluation, we organize our analysis around estimating
the value of a statistical illness (VSI), although we allow for the identification of a concept
that is similar to the more-traditional value of statistical life (VSL). The VSI evaluates the
set of heterogeneous health outcomes associated with a given illness risks. Policy changes
that aﬀect the prevalence and severity of that illness will shift the joint distribution of the
duration of morbidity and premature mortality, for specified populations, and our model is
capable of assessing the benefits of such shifts.
Our analyses illustrate some initial results concerning how marginal utility of risk miti-
gation varies systematical across individuals. Specifically, we evaluate how the demand for
mortality risk reduction varies with assumed individual discount rates, incomes, the individ-
ual’s current age and the disease latencies that dictate the future ages at which degraded
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health states would be experienced. Our results suggest that the presumption that there
should be a single number for the VSL is misguided. While the use of a single number
may continue to be dictated by political concerns, economically the VSL should be viewed
as a multi-dimensional schedule of values. Since it is ultimately a type of inverse demand
function, this heterogeneity should not be surprising.
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Table 1 – Main Illness Profile Attributes, by Label Assigned to Health Threat, Means and Standard Deviations  
(Estimating Sample = 1619 individuals, 7520 choice sets, 15040 illness profiles,  22560 alternatives)   
Health Threat: Breast Prostate Colon Lung Skin Heart Heart Stroke Resp. Traffic Diabetes Alzheim. 
 Cancer Cancer Cancer Cancer Cancer Attack Disease  Disease Accident  disease 
             
# profiles 697 676 1357 1368 1353 1406 1423 1424 1337 1295 1357 1347 
             
Monthly cost 
(dollars) 
30.78 
(30.09) 
28.12 
(26.09) 
29.35 
(28.37) 
30.4 
(28.7) 
30.19 
(28.81) 
29.85 
(29.62) 
29.87 
(28.63) 
30.85 
(29.43) 
29.77 
(29.41) 
29.72 
(27.92) 
29.17 
(28.07) 
29.84 
(28.54) 
             
Risk difference 
 
-0.0033 
(0.0016) 
-0.0034 
(0.0017) 
-0.0034 
(0.0017) 
-0.0034 
(0.0017) 
-0.0035 
(0.0017) 
-0.0035 
(0.0017) 
-0.0034 
(0.0017) 
-0.0034 
(0.0017) 
-0.0034 
(0.0017) 
-0.0034 
(0.0017) 
-0.0033 
(0.0016 
-0.0033 
(0.0016) 
             
Latency (years) 
 
16.97 
(10.95) 
18.52 
(11.2) 
18.37 
(11.57) 
19.35 
(11.46) 
17.6 
(11.68) 
20.48 
(12.54) 
19.42 
(11.94) 
21.79 
(12.67) 
21.39 
(12.18) 
18.21 
(12.32) 
18.23 
(10.82) 
22.63 
(12.51) 
             
Illness years 
 
4.861 
(3.481) 
4.917 
(3.853) 
8.546 
(8.295) 
8.294 
(7.681) 
7.478 
(7.322) 
3.421 
(6.649) 
10.239 
(8.84) 
3.593 
(6.429) 
7.37 
(6.529) 
4.036 
(7.596) 
6.798 
(5.817) 
6.805 
(4.661) 
             
Lost life-years 
 
11.54 
(11.4) 
12.03 
(11.5) 
8.88 
(9.71) 
10.32 
(9.75) 
10.33 
(10.79) 
13.54 
(11.26) 
7.41 
(8.42) 
12 
(10.07) 
7.99 
(7.81) 
14.49 
(12.51) 
13.44 
(10.72) 
8.8 
(6.42) 
             
Sudden death 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0.52 
 
0 
 
0.51 
 
0 
 
0.51 
 
0 
 
0 
 
             
Recover 
 
0.60 
 
0.64 
 
0.39 
 
0.23 
 
0.40 
 
0.19 
 
0.26 
 
0.19 
 
0.38 
 
0.19 
 
0 
 
0 
 
             
Die within 6 years 
 
0.40 
 
0.36 
 
0.22 
 
0.36 
 
0.30 
 
0.08 
 
0.11 
 
0.07 
 
0.21 
 
0.07 
 
0.85 
 
0.84 
 
             
Chronic effects 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0.37 
 
0.41 
 
0.30 
 
0.21 
 
0.63 
 
0.24 
 
0.41 
 
0.23 
 
0.15 
 
0.16 
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Table 2 – Ad Hoc Models; Linear Additively Separable Structural Model 
(No selection correction, Fixed effects conditional logit)a 
 Model 1 
Ad hoc 
Model 2 
Ad hoc 
Model 3 
Structural 
Monthly Cost of Program -0.007581 -0.007491 - 
  (-9.63)*** (-9.48)***  
Risk Reduction 89.27 57.64 - 
  (9.95)*** (5.77)***  
Sick-Years  - 0.0879 - 
    (3.85)***  
Lost  Life-Years - 0.01138 - 
    (7.13)***  ( )[ ]500 10 first income termβ ×  - - 4.88 
   (8.60)*** ( )[ ]910 10 second income termβ ×  - - -0.220 
   (-4.71)*** 
( )10 AS Ai ipdviα ∆Π  - - -8.390 
   (-5.00)*** 
( )20 AS Ai ipdvrα ∆Π  - - -8.02 
   (-2.48)*** 
( )30 AS Ai ipdvlα ∆Π  - - -8.08 
   (-6.04)*** 
Alternatives 22560 22560 22560 
Log-likelihood -11735.13 -11706.11 -11733.47 
  
a Asymptotic t-test statistics in parentheses (***=statistically significant at better than 1% level)  
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Table 3 – Evolution of Estimating Specification (Alternatives = 22560) 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
(Parameter) Variable Simple Logs w/ P(select) Translog Quad in Age 
5.35 5.34 5.89 5.19 ( )[ ]500 10 first income termβ ×  
(9.20)*** (9.18)*** (9.79)*** (8.31)*** 
-0.2155 -0.2159 -0.2094 -0.1991 ( )[ ]910 10 second income termβ ×  
(4.61)*** (4.61)*** (4.46)*** (4.22)*** 
-24.7 -26.8 -51.3 -47.8 ( ) ( )10 log 1AS Ai ipdviα ∆Π +  
(4.22)*** (4.52)*** (5.75)*** (5.32)*** 
 3.181 3.153 3.280 ( ) ( )13 ( ) log 1AS Ai i iP sel P pdviα ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− ∆Π +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
 
(2.13)** 
 
(2.12)** 
 
(2.19)** 
 
-21.52 -21.54 -19.59 -16.45 ( ) ( )20 log 1AS Ai ipdvrα ∆Π +  
(2.29)** (2.30)** (2.09)** (1.74)* 
-30.59 -30.48 -68.62 -582.4 ( ) ( )30 log 1AS Ai ipdvlα ∆Π +  
(6.00)*** (5.98)*** (3.66)*** (3.26)*** 
- - - 20.58 ( ) ( )31 0 log 1AS Ai i iage pdvlα ∆Π +  
   (2.84)*** 
- - - -0.1888 ( ) ( )232 0 log 1AS Ai i iage pdvlα ∆Π +  
   (2.72)*** 
- - 9.263 200.6 ( ) ( ) 240 log 1AS Ai ipdvlα ⎡ ⎤∆Π +⎣ ⎦  
  
(-1.13) 
 
(2.43)** 
 
- - - -7.848 ( ) ( ) 241 0 log 1AS Ai i iage pdvlα ⎡ ⎤∆Π +⎣ ⎦  
   
(2.33)** 
 
- - - 0.0746 ( ) ( ) 2242 0 log 1AS Ai i iage pdvlα ⎡ ⎤∆Π +⎣ ⎦  
   
(2.29)** 
 
- - 34.71 102.1 ( ) ( )
( )
50 log 1
            log 1
AS A
i i
A
i
pdvi
pdvl
α ⎡ ⎤∆Π +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤× +⎣ ⎦
 
  
(4.25)*** 
 
 
 
(-1.40) 
 
 
 
- - - -4.47 ( ) ( )
( )
51 0 log 1
            log 1
AS A
i i i
A
i
age pdvi
pdvl
α ⎡ ⎤∆Π +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤× +⎣ ⎦
 
   
(-1.57) 
 
 
 
- - - 0.056 ( ) ( )
( )
2
52 0 log 1
            log 1
AS A
i i i
A
i
age pdvi
pdvl
α ⎡ ⎤∆Π +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤× +⎣ ⎦
 
   
(2.10)** 
 
 
 
Alternatives 22560 22560 22560 22560 
Log L -11729.021 -11726.662 -11716.989 -11694.991 
Sample mean fitted VSI ($ million) a 7.15 7.47 0.9 2.59 
a The survey provides no opportunity for respondents to express a negative willingness to pay. At worst, they can merely 
prefer the status quo alternative.  In this table, we interpret individual negative fitted VSI estimates as zero values. 
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Table 4 – Simulations:  Discount Rate Sensitivity Analysisa (VSI in $million) 
Model 7 Specification 
45 years old 
 now;  at 45: r=3% r=5% r=7% 
1 yr sick, non-fatal 
 
2.55 
[1.19, 3.88] 
2.35 
[1.1, 3.69] 
2.29 
[1.11, 3.7] 
5 yrs sick, non-fatal 
 
3.83 
[2.51, 5.24] 
3.58 
[2.28, 4.91] 
3.46 
[2.29, 4.87] 
1 yr sick; then die 
 
5.59 
[4.01, 7.53] 
4.52 
[3.01, 6.22] 
3.68 
[1.98, 5.74] 
5 yrs sick; then die 
 
5.57 
[3.94, 7.71] 
4.39 
[2.79, 6.37] 
3.40 
[1.66, 5.61] 
Sudden death 
 5.49 [3.76, 7.43] 
4.48 
[2.85, 6.44] 
3.82 
[2.13, 5.67] 
 a Across 1000 random draws from the joint distribution of estimated parameters: median, 5th and 95th 
percentiles of the sampling distribution of calculated VSI.  Estimated parameters differ somewhat with 
the discount rate assumption employed in the construction of the estimating variables. Income = $42,000.
 
 
Table 5 – Income Sensitivity Analysisa (VSI in $million) 
Model 7 Specification 
45 years old 
 now;  at 45 y=$25,000 y=$42,000 y=$67,500 
1 yr sick; non-fatal 
 
1.99 
[0.87, 3.14] 
2.35 
[1.1, 3.69] 
3.34 
[1.61, 5.76] 
5 yrs sick; non-fatal 
 
3.02 
[1.92, 4.21] 
3.58 
[2.28, 4.91] 
5.04 
[3.17, 7.87] 
1 yr sick; then die 
 
3.55 
[2.31, 5.02] 
4.52 
[3.01, 6.22] 
7.05 
[4.59, 10.89] 
5 yrs sick; then die 
 
3.53 
[2.15, 5.08] 
4.39 
[2.79, 6.37] 
6.74 
[4.15, 10.99] 
Sudden death 
 3.51 [2.22, 5.10] 
4.48 
[2.85, 6.44] 
7.01 
[4.56, 10.63] 
 a Across 1000 random draws from the joint distribution of estimated parameters: median, 5th and 95th 
percentiles of the sampling distribution of calculated VSI. Estimated parameters are identical across 
simulations. Discount rate = 5%. 
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Table 6 – Latency Sensitivity Analysisa (VSI in $million) fixed effects specification  
                     Selected Illness Profiles (Model 7 Specification) 
Age: Onset 
 
1 year sick, 
non-fatal 
5 years sick, 
non-fatal 
1 year sick, 
then die 
5 years sick, 
then die 
Sudden death 
 
Now 35 years old:      
Now  2.47 
[1.19, 3.87] 
3.75 
[2.42, 5.11] 
4.59 
[2.82, 6.62] 
4.73 
[2.83, 7] 
4.47 
[2.41, 6.64] 
At age 40  2.2 
[1.05, 3.49] 
3.36 
[2.18, 4.6] 
4.44 
[3.06, 6.09] 
4.65 
[3.17, 6.49] 
4.29 
[2.61, 6.09] 
At age 50 1.71 
[0.79, 2.73] 
2.63 
[1.72, 3.6] 
4.03 
[3.1, 5.22] 
4.29 
[3.35, 5.53] 
3.9 
[2.82, 5.2] 
At age 60 1.28 
[0.59, 2.04] 
1.95 
[1.31, 2.67] 
3.43 
[2.68, 4.48] 
3.6 
[2.88, 4.67] 
3.34 
[2.52, 4.45] 
At age 70 0.89 
[0.44, 1.4] 
1.34 
[0.95, 1.79] 
2.56 
[1.86, 3.51] 
2.58 
[1.98, 3.43] 
2.51 
[1.8, 3.46] 
At age 80 0.52 
[0.33, 0.75] 
0.78 
[0.62, 0.99] 
1.34 
[0.89, 1.9] 
1.06 
[0.82, 1.38] 
1.37 
[0.87, 1.99] 
      
Now 65 years old:      
Now 2.22 
[1.06, 3.43] 
3.16 
[2.01, 4.28] 
1.21 
[-0.28, 2.85] 
-0.86 
[-2.69, 0.8] 
2.88 
[1.32, 4.82] 
At age 70 1.95 
[0.92, 3] 
2.79 
[1.81, 3.72] 
1.38 
[0.42, 2.48] 
-0.06 
[-1.25, 0.97] 
2.53 
[1.4, 3.88] 
At age 80 1.38 
[0.7, 2.08] 
1.94 
[1.38, 2.53] 
1.4 
[0.69, 2.03] 
1.01 
[0.33, 1.58] 
1.8 
[0.98, 2.6] 
At age 90 
 0.54 [0.26, 0.82] 
1.07 
[0.73, 1.42] 
0.54 
[0.26, 0.82] 
- b 
 
0.53 
[0.02, 1.02] 
a Across 1000 random draws from the joint distribution of estimated parameters: median, 5th and 95th percentiles of the sampling 
distribution of calculated VSI. Signs of parameters are unconstrained. 
b 95 years is beyond the nominal life expectancy of 65-year-olds, so simulations are not conformable 
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                            Figure 1 – Implicit VSL associated with sudden death now, as a function of respondent age 
                                             ($ million)  Estimated without sign constraints. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           Figure 2 – Implicit VSL for ten years of latency, five years of illness, death in 15 years, 
                                             as a function of respondent age now ($ million)  Estimated without sign constraints. 
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Appendix A 
 
Example: Conjoint Choice Set 
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Appendix B – Supplementary Tables 
 
B.1 To be included with paper 
 
 
 
Table B1 – Sample versus Population Characteristics 
(percent) 
 Sample 
n=1619 
individuals 
2000 U.S. 
Census 
Age  % of 25+ pop 
25 to 34 18 22 
35 to 44 23 25 
45 to 54 21 21 
55 to 64 17 7 
65 to 74 14 6 
75 and older 7 10 
   
Income  % of hhlds 
Less than $10,000 5.7 9.5 
$10,000 to $15,000 6.1 6.3 
$15,000 to $20,000 4.9 6.3 
$20,000 to $25,000 6.1 6.6 
$25,000 to $30,000 6.6 6.4 
$30,000 to $40,000 7.4 6.4 
$40,000 to $50,000 8.6 5.9 
$50,000 to $60,000 13.3 10.7 
$60,000 to $75,000 11.1 9.0 
$75,000 to $100,000 11.1 10.4 
$100,000 to $125,000 10.4 10.2 
More than $125,000  4.2 5.2 
   
Female 0.51 0.51 
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B2. Available from the authors 
 
Table B2 - Assessing the Impact of Sample Inclusion Criteria 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Parameter 100, wk,cr,by 
80, 
wk,cr,by 
60, 
wk,cr,by wk,cr,by wk,by by none 
5.343 5.250 5.402 5.208 5.376 7.513 7.582 5
0 10β ×  (8.14)*** (8.18)*** (8.53)*** (8.34)*** (9.57)*** (13.68)*** (14.14)*** 
-0.2332 -0.215 -0.2271 -0.199 -0.2241 -0.2279 -0.2327 9
1 10β ×  (4.64)*** (4.39)*** (4.72)*** (4.22)*** (5.26)*** (5.53)*** (5.74)*** 
-47.93 -47.80 -49.26 -45.57 -37.03 21.29 22.67 
10α  (5.09)*** (5.20)*** (5.45)*** (5.11)*** (4.58)*** (2.72)*** (2.94)*** 
-19.18 -18.84 -17.43 -16.45 -17.18 -2.09 -0.57 
11α  (1.92)* (1.95)* (1.83)* (1.74)* (2.01)** -0.25 -0.07 
-656.2 -669.1 -663.1 -585.0 -434.6 -153.7 -155.1 
20α  (3.44)*** (3.61)*** (3.66)*** (3.28)*** (2.71)*** -1.01 -1.03 
21.89 22.61 23.13 20.70 15.04 9.73 9.65 
21α  (2.86)*** (3.02)*** (3.15)*** (2.85)*** (2.29)** -1.56 -1.57 
-0.1943 -0.1997 -0.2083 -0.1901 -0.1341 -0.0915 -0.0896 
30α  (2.67)*** (2.80)*** (2.97)*** (2.74)*** (2.12)** -1.52 -1.51 
238.7 238.7 230.9 202.0 172.2 80.6 85.6 
31α  (2.71)*** (2.79)*** (2.77)*** (2.45)** (2.33)** -1.14 -1.23 
-8.789 -8.870 -8.856 -7.912 -6.646 -4.471 -4.593 
4α  (2.48)** (2.56)** (2.61)*** (2.35)** (2.19)** -1.55 -1.61 
0.0808 0.081 0.0825 0.07528 0.06138 0.04291 0.04342 
50α  (2.37)** (2.43)** (2.51)** (2.31)** (2.08)** -1.52 -1.56 
67.76 94.45 98.17 104.57 51.73 -8.08 -11.78 
51α  -0.87 -1.25 -1.33 -1.44 -0.79 -0.13 -0.19 
        
Alternatives 19881 21030 21855 22560 27447 34155 35151 
Log L -10296.949 -10894.039 -11319.506 -11697.495 -14224.012 -17681.197 -18260.971 
        
continued… 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Parameter 100, wk,cr,by 
80, 
wk,cr,by 
60, 
wk,cr,by wk,cr,by wk,by by none 
Sample mean VSI  6.61 3.31 3.52 2.5 2.52 0.05 0.05 
Sample 5th % 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample 25th % 1.28 1.16 1.11 1.07 0.76 0 0 
Sample 50th % 2.33 2.19 2.08 1.94 1.54 0 0 
Sample 75th % 4.15 3.82 3.63 3.23 2.71 0 0 
Sample 95th % 12.94 9.69 9.95 6.95 7.24 0.03 0 
 
Key to inclusion criteria:  “100” = aggregate time on all five program choice tasks at least 100 seconds (e.g. average time 20 
seconds per choice set); analogously for “80” and “60”; “wk” = choice of Neither Program not explained solely by “I did not 
believe the programs would work” (i.e. scenario rejection); “cr” = passed simple risk comprehension question at end of risk 
tutorial; “by” = choice did not involve an (erroneously designed) life extension from the illness experience. The most substantial 
impact is associated with the “wk” (scenario rejection) criterion. 
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Table B3 – Effect of Discounting Assumption on Parameter Estimates 
(Parameter) Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 r=.03 r=.05 R=.07 
4.14 5.19 6.17 ( )[ ]500 10 first income termβ ×  
(8.31)*** (8.31)*** (8.21)*** 
-0.1499 -0.1991 -0.2524 ( )[ ]910 10 second income termβ ×  
(4.02)*** (4.22)*** (4.39)*** 
-40.6 -47.8 -54.8 ( ) ( )10 log 1AS Ai ipdviα ∆Π +  
(4.96)*** (5.32)*** (5.57)*** 
2.664 3.280 3.925 ( ) ( )13 ( ) log 1AS Ai i iP sel P pdviα ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− ∆Π +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (2.14)** (2.20)** 
 
(2.20)** 
-13.00 -16.45 -20.21 ( ) ( )20 log 1AS Ai ipdvrα ∆Π +  
(1.72)* (1.74)* (1.72)* 
-358.9 -582.4 -888.4 ( ) ( )30 log 1AS Ai ipdvlα ∆Π +  
(2.39)** (3.26)*** (4.05)*** 
13.11 20.58 30.69 ( ) ( )31 0 log 1AS Ai i iage pdvlα ∆Π +  
(2.13)** (2.84)*** (3.51)*** 
-0.1265 -0.1888 -0.2711 ( ) ( )232 0 log 1AS Ai i iage pdvlα ∆Π +  
(2.13)** (2.72)*** (3.28)*** 
96.80 200.6 381.5 ( ) ( ) 240 log 1AS Ai ipdvlα ⎡ ⎤∆Π +⎣ ⎦  (1.64)* (2.43)** 
 
(3.26)*** 
-4.149 -7.848 -14.13 ( ) ( ) 241 0 log 1AS Ai i iage pdvlα ⎡ ⎤∆Π +⎣ ⎦  (1.70)* (2.33)** 
 
(3.04)*** 
0.0425 0.0746 0.1274 ( ) ( ) 2242 0 log 1AS Ai i iage pdvlα ⎡ ⎤∆Π +⎣ ⎦  (1.76)* (2.29)** 
 
(2.90)*** 
74.48 102.1 140.1 ( ) ( )
( )
50 log 1
            log 1
AS A
i i
A
i
pdvi
pdvl
α ⎡ ⎤∆Π +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤× +⎣ ⎦
 
(-1.58) 
 
 
 
(-1.4) 
 
 
 
(-1.28) 
 
 
 
-3.372 -4.47 -5.899 ( ) ( )
( )
51 0 log 1
            log 1
AS A
i i i
A
i
age pdvi
pdvl
α ⎡ ⎤∆Π +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤× +⎣ ⎦
 
(1.78)* 
 
 
 
(-1.57) 
 
 
 
(-1.42) 
 
 
 
0.0429 0.056 0.0723 ( ) ( )
( )
2
52 0 log 1
            log 1
AS A
i i i
A
i
age pdvi
pdvl
α ⎡ ⎤∆Π +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤× +⎣ ⎦
 
(2.34)** 
 
 
 
(2.10)** 
 
 
 
(1.89)* 
 
 
 
Alternatives 22560 22560 22560 
 51
Log L -11694.154 -11694.991 -11697.598 
Sample mean fitted VSI ($ million) a 3.20 2.59 2.28 
Sample 5th % 0 0 0 
Sample 25th % 1.51 1.12 0.78 
Sample 50th % 2.64 2 1.53 
Sample 75th % 4.25 3.33 2.69 
Sample 95th % 8.52 7.14 6.67 
    
Age at maximum of first age profile 
  on ( )log 1Aipdvl +  term 51.8 54.5 56.6 
Age at minimum of second age profile 
  on ( ) 2log 1Aipdvl⎡ ⎤+⎣ ⎦   term 48.9 52.6 55.4 
Age at minimum of third age profile 
  ( ) ( )log 1 log 1A Ai ipdvi pdvl⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ × +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  term 39.3 39.9 40.8 
 
